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Abstract: Cyberconflict provides a new set of challenges to the Law of Armed Conflict. The 
proposals in the recent Tallinn Manual 2.0 provide a good start, but they are incomplete and do 
not address important issues. Where laws are lacking, states adopt norms to provide consistency 
and deterrence. This article provides a broad taxonomy of cyberconflict norms for use by 
government policymakers, including norms for low-level cyberconflict, norms for starting 
cyberconflict, norms for conducting it, and norms for post-conflict operations. It also introduces 
the concept of ‘metanorms’, norms for handling other norms. 
 




Introduction—Cyberwarfare and Cyberconflict 
Before getting into details, it is necessary to provide some standard definitions. ‘Cyber’ is an 
adjective used to refer to computers, digital devices, and digital networks. ‘Cyber attacks’ are 
malicious   activities   targeting   cyber   entities   for   political,   military,   or   monetary   gain. 
‘Cyberwarfare’  is  warfare  involving  cyber  attacks  (Carr  2011;  Singer  &  Friedman  2014). 
‘Cyberconflict’ includes cyberwarfare, but also a range of actions with coercive intent, such as 
espionage and attempts to influence using cyber means (Robinson, Jones & Janicke 2015). The 
activities comprising cyberconflict are also termed ‘cyber operations’. The distinction between 
cyberwarfare and cyberconflict is important because the first version of the Tallinn Manual 
(Schmitt 2013) labelled its subject ‘cyberwarfare’, while the recent second version (Schmitt 2017) 
labelled its subject ‘cyber operations’. Both manuals are proposals by international legal experts 
for laws governing cyberwarfare and cyber operations that would apply to nation-states and would 
extend the ‘Just War’ theory. The shift in emphasis in the second version was intended to broaden 
the coverage of the proposals to apply to most of today’s cyber operations, including peacetime 
regimes (Leetaru 2017), so the second version is considerably longer. While cyberwarfare has been 
rare, other cyber operations occur continually. 
 
For several reasons, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 (Schmitt 2017) does not cover most possible laws, 
rules, and norms for cyberconflict. First, the 2017 manual is focused on legal definitions that 
extend non-cyber law, so it only addresses issues having some analogy in current non-cyber law 
(Schmitt & Vihul 2014). Second, it tries to represent international consensus, but states have 
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different values and must always have the ability to set their own norms on issues that particularly 
matter to them, such as Internet censorship. Third, cyberspace is inherently transnational (as data 
and programs do not respect borders of states); attempts to regulate it using traditional notions of 
nation-states may be doomed to failure (Dipert 2010). 
 
Formalised Norms for Cyberwarfare and Cyberconflict 
Norms are principles or policies that people or groups follow to resolve ethical or policy problems, 
or are “collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors” (Thomas 2001, p. 27). Norms 
have traditionally arisen from ethics (Lucas 2016), but they can also come from politics, science, 
or other sources (Thomas 2001). Norms are invoked when law does not apply, so they are close to 
what is termed ‘customary law’. Since cyberwarfare has only recently become possible, 
international law such as humanitarian law (International Committee of the Red Cross 2012) is 
only gradually catching up with the new legal implications, as in both Tallinn Manuals (Morgus 
2016). Meanwhile, norms can provide guidance to decision-makers. 
 
Norms can be informal or formal, can pertain to an individual or a group, and can be advisory or 
mandatory (Thomas 2001). This article focuses on norms for government policymakers, the 
generally mandatory written norms of the government of a nation-state. The reason for this 
narrowing of focus is to enable an exploration of what is missing from the two versions of the 
Tallinn Manual. Thus, the norms discussed here will have most of the force of laws within their 
states. The hope with most such norms, as with both Tallinn Manuals, is to become de facto 
international standards and eventually international law (Nye 2016/2017). Standardisation of 
norms makes it easier for states to be consistent and this standardisation also provides models for 
states that do not have time to investigate cyberconflict issues in detail. Still, there are sceptics 
about cyber norms (Mazanec 2016). 
 
Cyberconflict involves software, and norms of a different sort are common for many kinds of 
software, as, for instance, norms for file formats and network protocols. Some of these are 
endorsed by international standards agreements (such as those of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers [IEEE]) or specialised organisations (such as the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers [ICANN]) for regulating Internet addresses, but others are just 
standard practice. Thus, norms for cyberconflict are consistent with other software practice. 
 
The United States has been trying to formalise its norms for cyberconflict (Stevens 2012), but it 
has much work ahead (Crowley & Gerstein 2014). Norms for policymakers in all countries will 
likely change more often than laws since they are more flexible; for instance, a country that suffers 
a serious cyber attack will likely change its norms, as did Estonia after 2007. Norms can also be 
emergent, gradually arising from the experiences of each state and analysis of its successes and 
failures; furthermore, norms arising this way may be a better basis for successful international 
agreements (Lucas 2016). 
 
Many norms for cyberconflict have been proposed. Some relate to cyberconflict operations short 
of war, some relate to starting cyberwarfare (jus ad bellum), some to fighting cyberwarfare (jus in 
bello), and some to the aftermath of cyberconflict. This article considers them in that order. Many 
but not all the issues in the second and third contexts relate to ‘Just War’ theory, and most of the 
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issues in the first and fourth do not. This article is based on issues observed in a broad range of 
discussions in the literature. 
 
Tables 1 and 2, below, summarise the author’s taxonomy of cyberconflict norms that can and 
should be put into government policies, the specifics of which are discussed in the remainder of 
this article. Here ‘T’ means the norm is covered in a reasonable level of detail in the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 (Schmitt 2017); ‘O’ means the norm is primarily for offensive operations; and ‘D’ 
means the norm is primarily for defensive operations. It can be seen that norms include many 




A.  What  metanorms  does  a  state  use  for 
managing other norms? 
• Does the state publicise its norms? 
• Are norms context-dependent? 
• Are norms randomised? 
• Do methods permit counterattack? (O) 
• Does the state want other countries to 
use its norms as well? 
• Which norms require reciprocity? 
B.  What  role  does  cyberconflict  play  in  a 
national strategy? 
• Does the state conduct cyber operations 
at all? (O) 
• Does it think cyber-operation 
capabilities deter aggression? (O) 
• Is it willing to risk costly counterattacks 
from cyberconflict? (O) 
• Does  it  allow  cyberconflict  to  entail 
perfidy? (O) 
 
C.  When and how does a state conduct low- 
level cyber operations? 
• Will the state conduct cyber espionage? 
• Will it conduct cyber coercion? (O) 
• What targets will it consider? (T, O) 
• How  will  it  reduce  the  danger  of 
escalation? (T, O) 
• How willing is it to share information 
about vulnerabilities it discovers in 
cyberspace, both publicly and within its 
government? (D) 
• Can  entities  other  than  governments 
perform cyber operations? Will the 
government police them? (O) 
D.  When does a state use cyber attack as an 
instrument of national policy? 
• What level of damage over what time 
period ensures a state’s response? (D) 
• How much certainty in the attribution 
of cyber attacks does it require before it 
counterattacks? (T, D) 
• How  does  it  rate  the  importance  of 
attack targets? (O) 
• Can a non-cyber attack on a state entail 
a cyber-attack response? (O) 
• Can a cyber attack on a state entail a 
non-cyber response? (O) 
• To what extent will it attack dual-use 
(jointly military and civilian) targets? 
(T, O) 
• What counter-cyber attacks of a state 
will be automated responses? (O, D) 
 
Table 1: Key cyberconflict policy norms, part 1 (T = covered in Schmitt [2017]); O = applies primarily to 
offensive cyberconflict; D = applies primarily to defensive cyberconflict) 
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E.  How does a state conduct cyberconflict 
when it must? 
• Can attacks anticipate a conflict? (T, 
O) 
• To what extent will a state intervene in 
the internal affairs of another state with 
its attack? (T, O) 
• Will  a  state  purchase  cyberweapons 
commercially? (O) 
• To what extent will it acknowledge its 
cyber attacks? (O) 
• How will it try to limit escalation of 
counterattacks? (T, O) 
• Will it exploit neutral states as stepping 
stones and how? (T, O) 
• How much overkill will it design in its 
cyberweapons? (T, O) 
• Does it avoid attacking certain kinds of 
targets? (O) 
• What  will  it  do  if  it  hurts  civilians 
significantly? (T, O) 
• Will it camouflage its cyber resources 
and how? (D) 
F.  How does a state behave after 
cyberconflict? 
• Will  a  state  assist  other  states  in 
attributing and analysing cyber attacks 
on them? How much is it willing to 
reveal about its own attribution 
methods in doing so? (D) 
• Does a state acknowledge an obligation 
to assist in repair of cyber damage it 
has caused? (T, O) 
• Will it do things to make it easier to 
repair its cyber damage? (O) 
• Will   it   criminally   prosecute   cyber 
attacks short of war against it? (D) 
• Does it seek international agreements 
to limit the spread of malware and 
cyberweapons? (D) 
 
Table 2: Key cyberconflict policy norms, part 2 (T = covered in Schmitt [2017]); O = applies primarily to 





It  is  first  useful  to  identify norms  for the use  of other norms,  what  the author defines  as 
‘metanorms’ (Table 1, box A). These metanorms may also be part of a government policy. 
 
One metanorm is whether a state’s norm is public or private. For instance, a state can announce 
publicly that any attacks on its power plants will be met by retaliation, while privately setting a 
policy of non-retaliation to avoid escalation of conflict. The public stance provides a measure of 
deterrence and permits other states to provide feedback on whether they consider the norm 
acceptable. On the other hand, a state that often behaves inconsistently with regard to its public 
stance will lose credibility for the deterrence effect of its public norms. For instance, when states 
have proclaimed they will not negotiate with hostage-takers but then do negotiate, their actions 
undermine their credibility for future hostage negotiations. 
 
A second metanorm is the degree to which applications of norms depend on context. If a state is 
influenced by political pressures, it may counterattack more harshly against certain countries than 
others in response to the same provocation. States may also be more inclined to attack certain 
targets than others, as seen, for instance, in North Korea’s eagerness to attack sources of any 
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criticism of its leaders. The laws of war do not permit many exceptions based on such external 
considerations. 
 
Related to this, a metanorm is the consistency by which a state applies a norm even when context 
is taken into account. Exhibition of inconsistent and unpredictable norms by a state make it difficult 
for it to conduct diplomacy. Laws are intended to enforce predictability, but norms have no such 
mechanism, though international outcry or retaliation can provide some feedback when norms are 
inconsistent. However, two-person adversarial game theory suggests advantages in randomising 
norms as a “mixed strategy”: unpredictability makes it harder for an adversary to counter the 
actions of another (Harrington 2014). 
 
Another metanorm is the degree to which a state fairly conducts its cyber operations. Will a state 
conduct cyber attacks against countries that cannot defend themselves adequately because they 
lack technical knowledge and resources? Will the state permit its attack targets a fair opportunity 
to use their own exploits to conduct cyber attacks in return? Otherwise the state could be 
institutionalising cowardice. 
 
An additional metanorm is the degree to which a state’s norms respect international standards. For 
instance, North Korea has little respect for norms about mounting unprovoked cyber attacks on 
other states. States that respect international standards on norms will find more support and aid 
from the international community. 
 
A final metanorm is the degree to which norms are based on reciprocity or following of similar 
norms by adversaries (Thomas 2001). This represents the degree to which norms have primarily 
an external instead of internal origin. Internal norms are more likely to remain consistent with 
changing international situations. 
 
 
Norms about Using Cyber Operations Instead of Other Methods 
Next it is necessary to consider specific norms. A first issue is whether a state should conduct 
cyberwarfare and cyber operations at all (Table 1, box B). Interstate warfare has been decreasing 
in the last 50 years because it has rarely achieved anything (Regehr 2015). Furthermore, warfare 
has been conducted for centuries without cyber operations, so there is no military necessity for 
them. International agreements have effectively banned chemical and biological weapons, and 
nuclear weapons have been all but banned by a taboo against their use (Sauer 2016). So, it stands 
to reason that a state could adopt a norm against the use of cyberweapons and cyber operations. 
Cyberweapons are costly to develop (Rid & Arquilla 2012), unreliable (Rowe 2016), and can 
easily hurt civilians indiscriminately (Rowe 2016). Certainly, there is a fad for them right now, but 
nations do not need to follow fads. Today every state needs to have a thorough cyber-defence 
program. However, this program need not be coupled with cyber-attack development. ‘The best 
defence is a good offense’ is a maxim of tactics, not strategy. 
 
Another reason for adopting a norm forswearing cyber operations is that doing so is consistent 
with the Geneva Conventions on the issue of perfidy (Rowe 2013). Nearly all cyber attacks involve 
impersonating a neutral party, such as an operating system or software. Impersonation of neutral 
parties is perfidy and is outlawed by the conventions because it would lead to lack of trust in 
A Taxonomy of Norms in Cyberconflict for Government Policymakers 





necessary neutral agents in warfare such as the Red Cross. Operating systems and software are the 
neutral agents in cyberspace upon which everything depends. 
 
Another reason is that, for specific adversaries, a state can be more vulnerable in cyberspace than 
its adversaries. The United States and Europe have such extensive cyber infrastructure that it would 
be foolish for them to attack a country such as North Korea with few cyber assets, because large 
cyber assets are not necessary for mounting damaging cyber counterattacks (since cyber-attack 
software can be purchased). Finally, cyber operations are like drone warfare in that they can be 
waged at a distance without risking the attacker’s health. Peace advocates have argued that nations 
that exhibit cowardice cannot claim to be role models for the rest of the world. 
 
The difficulty of deterrence with cyberweapons 
Perhaps the best reason for forswearing cyber operations is that cyber weapons rarely deter in 
cyberspace (Cooper 2012); therefore, there is little justification for assembling arsenals of 
cyberweapons. The large nuclear arsenal of the United States, of which all countries are aware, 
serves as a deterrent against nuclear attack because attackers would be sure of retaliation in kind. 
The United States also has formidable cyberweapons capabilities, but this has had little deterrent 
effect on Chinese and Russian cyber attacks against it, though some have argued it may deter other 
states from cyber attacks (Elliot 2011). Deterrence only works when a threat is clear and credible 
(Quinlan 2006). The effectiveness of using cyberweapons and cyber operations as deterrents has 
multiple problems. First, cyberweapons are not visible objects, and providing any details of an 
attack capability in an attempt to deter a victim makes it easier for the victim to block the attack, 
since revealing a capability will almost necessarily reveal vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
(Libicki 2013). Secondly, attribution of an attack is essential for a counterattack, but attribution is 
difficult in cyberspace (Rowe 2015). In addition, repeatability of a counterattack is also essential 
to deterrence, but cyber attacks are generally one-shot weapons since they are usually based on 
flaws that will be fixed quickly once demonstrated (Libicki 2009). Moreover, even if a 
cyberweapon is never used, it can be perishable since fixes may independently be found for the 
flaws that the weapon exploits. Finally, the number of cyberweapons a state possesses does not 
correlate with their combined effectiveness, since cyberweapons differ considerably in 
effectiveness, and much about their effectiveness is unknown against specific targets until they are 
used because it is hard to simulate an adversary’s computer systems exactly. Matters are quite 
different with nuclear weapons since there are only a few ways they can work, they are not 
especially perishable, and more nuclear weapons mean more potential attack targets. 
 
Deterrence is possible in cyberspace, but the best methods are defensive, not offensive (Radunovic 
2013). A site with an effective cyber defence can be tested by an adversary and shown to be 
effective, thereby suggesting to the adversary that it is not cost-effective to spend its time attacking 
it, even if the attack could eventually succeed. This is one reason the Chinese expend so much 
more effort attacking American civilian sites rather than the US military; the US military has better 
defences. Another good deterrent is to exhibit large numbers of eventually recognisable honeypots 
(decoy targets) so that the attackers know they will have a low success rate in reaching real targets. 
 
Norms for Low-Level Cyberconflict 
Attacks by nation-states not rising to the level of an armed attack (low-level cyberconflict) have 
increasingly occurred in recent years. Espionage is often considered part of the normal business of 
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governments, but it can be destabilising. This possibility is especially true for cyber espionage, 
and a state may formulate a norm foreswearing it. More serious forms of cyberconflict usually 
involve ‘cyber coercion’—threatening or demonstrating a capability to cause cyber harm 
(Flemming & Rowe 2015). Nations differ considerably on what they consider acceptable norms 
for cyber coercion and responding to it (Table 1, box C). Using cyber operations to interfere with 
the production of nuclear weapons by a country such as North Korea (as North Korea alleges 
against the United States) can be considered reasonable, but interfering with a power plant (as 
Ukraine alleged of Russia in 2014) or an election (as the United States alleged of Russia in 2016) 
are serious provocations. So, a complicated set of norms for justifying cyber operations is 
necessary. These norms will depend on the seriousness of the threat, the type of the threat, and the 
level of attribution of the threat. Even though low-level attacks are easier to implement than all- 
out cyberwarfare, and thus tempting for many states, there is always a risk of escalation. Norms 
can thus limit the scope of cyber attacks to reduce the danger. In fact, most cyber attacks qualify 
as a form of cybercrime in most states, and, since there are international agreements on cybercrime 
(Maurer 2011), cyber attacks can often be prosecuted as crimes in victim states (Grama 2010; 
International Court of Justice 2015). 
 
All states have a responsibility to police their citizens. Some cyber attacks by citizens of a state 
can be attributable to their state because of connections between the citizens and the government 
(Schmitt 2017, rules 14-19). Rule 17 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 states that acts “pursuant to the 
instructions of a state” are attributable to the state. But nations differ in the degree to which they 
police their citizens for particular kinds of crimes. For instance, bots (remotely controlled 
saboteurs) are hard to find. How much effort should a state be required to expend to find bots in 
its territory in order to stop or prevent attacks on other states? Norms could establish the degrees. 
The United Nations (United Nations General Assembly 2015, p.7) says states should “prevent ICT 
[Information and Communications Technology] practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or 
that may pose threats to international peace and security”, but this prohibition could cover many 
things. Malware development by a country is likely included, but it might also include prohibiting 
Microsoft and Adobe products since those have high rates of malware attack. Note that the cost to 
develop effective cyberweapons is becoming increasingly high as simple vulnerabilities are getting 
fixed, and cyberweapons development is increasingly beyond the capabilities of small groups of 
people such as terrorist cells. And although cyberweapons can be purchased, it takes skill to target 
them effectively. So, effective major cyber attacks are very likely to be state-sponsored. But lesser 
attacks could have all kinds of attackers from ‘patriots’ in a country (as reported by China and 
Russia) to victimised businesses (Lin, Allhoff & Abney 2014). 
 
Norms can also apply to the handling of cyber-attack intelligence. Since nearly all cyber attacks 
exploit errors and flaws in software design, and known errors and flaws get fixed quickly, secrecy 
about methods is important to the effectiveness of attacks. Thus, publishing information about 
newly-discovered cyber-attack methods is a good way to neutralise them, albeit not immediately 
(Nye 2015). Publishing is generally done after fixes are found and disseminated, so some 
deliberate delay to reduce further exploitation of the attack method is often a norm (Libicki 2012). 
Thus, a state needs norms for its dissemination policy, including its degree of sharing information 
with other states or even within the government (Owens, Dam & Lin 2009). Fortunately, most 
errors and flaws in software can be quickly fixed or neutralised once identified, and automatic 
software updates provide quick dissemination, so most delays are only a few days. Steps in this 
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direction of quick disclosure are already being taken by the US Cyber Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) and the US Department of Homeland Security. 
 
Norms can also be set or announced for commercial cyber espionage. All governments engage in 
some kind of espionage for government information, but, when a state such as China subsidises 
commercial cyber espionage, it is restraining free trade in a manner that most states do not consider 
acceptable (Libicki 2012). 
 
Norms about Going to War in Cyberspace (Jus ad Bellum) 
Both Schmitt (2013) and Schmitt (2017) devote a significant amount of space to the issue of when 
a cyber attack is legally justified. 
 
Defining an armed attack 
States now generally agree that a sufficiently damaging cyber attack can be an act of war (US 
White House 2011; Schmitt 2017, rule 69). A contentious issue is what level of cyber attack 
constitutes an ‘armed attack’ by the laws of war (Banks 2013) (Table 1, box D). Because of this 
dispute, norms for each state for starting cyberwar (jus ad bellum) are especially important. Since 
cyber attacks could cause many deaths in some circumstances and most experts would agree this 
would represent an armed attack, states must define a threshold (Nguyen 2013). On the other hand, 
cyber attacks by criminals (such as phishing) are an unfortunate part of the normal activity of the 
Internet and would not represent an armed attack even if initiated by a state. Hence, thresholds 
must be defined in norms, varying with the nature of the target (United Nations General Assembly 
2015) and the nature of the attack (Fidler 2012). Critical infrastructure demanding lower thresholds 
includes utilities, banks, medical facilities, food production and delivery, as well as cyber 
infrastructure, such as networking and cyber emergency response teams. 
 
A problem with identifying cyber attacks as ‘armed attacks’ is that they often consist of multiple 
steps taking place over a long period of time. Typically, access is gained to a system; malicious 
software is installed; the software gains control of the system; and then it damages something. This 
process may take years. At what point could a state counterattack in response to the discovery of 
a cyber attack? The traditional laws of war say not until damage has occurred, although exceptions 
are allowed in crises. That is because a potential attack may be neutralised before it occurs, in 
which case a counterattack is unjustified. This is certainly possible for cyber attacks, as alert 
system administrators could remove the attack from the systems it has infected before it is ever 
used. Or maybe not—perhaps the attack code uses a new technique that is difficult for a state to 
understand and remove in time, in which case a counterattack is the only reasonable response. 
Therefore, norms for counterattacks need to address potential attacks as well as actual attacks. 
 
Another problem with multiple attacks is that no one attack may rise to the threshold of an armed 
attack, but the cumulative effect does. For instance, North Korea has engaged in repeated 
disruptive cyber attacks on South Korea that have had serious cumulative effects on utilities and 
banks that amount to an armed attack (Geers et al. 2015). Another example could be an attack that 
diverts small amounts of funds repeatedly from a bank account to an adversary over a period of 
many years, where the individual transfers are small, but the total amount is large. Thus, states 
need to specify different norms of response on both individual attacks and groups of attacks. 
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Schmitt  (2017) provides several  criteria for unacceptable targets  of a  cyber attack  that  are 
analogous to those in conventional warfare. Attacks are prohibited on civilians (rules 93-98), 
civilian objects including cyber infrastructure (rules 99-102), other kinds of infrastructure (rules 
140-43), medical and religious personnel and infrastructure (rules 131-34), detained personnel 
(rules 135-37), children (rule 138), and journalists (rule 139). Attacks must not be indiscriminate 
(rules 105-06), cause unnecessary suffering (rules 104 and 107), or represent reprisals (rule 108). 
These criteria are more difficult to apply to the cyber domain, as they require some judgment which 
could be formalised as norms. States may wish to augment the list of unacceptable targets with 
those that raise political issues for them (Libicki 2016). 
 
A key problem offensively is identification of the target (Schmitt 2017, rule 115) since identities 
in cyberspace can be obscure; computer systems and files rarely identify clearly what they are. A 
key problem defensively is identification of who is attacking. This is critical for cyber- 
counterattacks, since a nation cannot counterattack an unknown adversary. Norms can specify the 
degree of certainty of attribution of a target or attacker before proceeding with an attack or a 
counterattack (Libicki 2012). Although attribution can be difficult for criminal cyber-attacks, 
states are increasingly making it easier to attribute their state-sponsored attacks, for political effect 
(Libicki 2016). Moreover, attacks are increasingly being traced by better network software; the 
large volume of traffic necessary for effective state-sponsored attacks can often betray them. 
 
Counterattacks in cyberspace are intrinsically problematic because there is often no visible target 
under the adversary’s control to counterattack. If an adversary in conventional warfare fires 
artillery at an opponent, that opponent can fire back at the spot or in the direction from which the 
artillery came. However, with cyber attacks, there is often only a vague notion of where the attack 
originated. Sites co-opted for the attack (as in Denial of Service [DoS] attacks) may be found, but 
these could be sites in neutral countries, and attacking them would violate their neutrality (Schmitt 
2017, rules 150-54). Total avoidance of neutral countries is difficult in cyberspace because of the 
ubiquitous automatic routing of data packets, but attacking neutral countries is still a clear violation 
of the laws of war. Encryption of attack packets can prevent malware attacks on intermediate sites, 
but it may not prevent DoS attacks on them, since intermediate sites can be flooded with encrypted 
packets too. Thus, norms for counterattack need to set high thresholds for attack severity, targets, 
and methods before response. 
 
A useful norm for cyberconflict is some form of the traditional diplomatic policy of non- 
intervention, meaning that a state will not get involved in internal affairs of another state through 
cyber means (Schmitt 2017, rule 66). But there are exceptions in conventional warfare that can 
also apply to cyberwarfare, such as when the chaos in a state (such as Syria) spills across its borders 
and threatens other states. This example illustrates how norms could define the exceptions. 
 
Mode of response to a cyber attack 
It has been argued that, consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, an attack in cyberspace that 
reaches the level of an armed attack should only entail a response in cyberspace, because a different 
kind of response could seem escalatory. But that is difficult to follow since cyber attacks generally 
require considerable lead time, and a much-delayed counterattack is hard to claim as self-defence 
(Schmitt 2017, rule 73). Non-cyber counterattacks in response to cyber attacks have been called 
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‘spillover’ (Maness & Valeriano 2016). Since cyber attacks vary widely in scale and effects, it 
would be important to make the spillover proportional. However, the broad, albeit mistaken, 
perception that cyber attacks are not serious attacks could mean that any spillover counterattack 
might be perceived as an escalation, so nations should probably set norms avoiding this kind of 
response. In reality, very little spillover of current cyberconflicts has been observed, even when 
there were ample opportunities (Maness & Valeriano 2016; Libicki 2016). 
 
In the other direction, it might make more sense for a traditional attack to receive a cyber- 
counterattack (Nye 2015). Nonetheless, a ‘no-first-use’ norm for cyber attacks for a powerful 
country such as the United States makes sense, because it is so much more vulnerable in 
cyberspace than many of its adversaries, and a first use of cyber attack by the United States would 
encourage damaging cyber-counterattacks against it. 
 
The speed of cyberconflict is high, and attacks can appear and disappear in a fraction of a second. 
Critical network log data of attacks can disappear in a matter of hours. This suggests that effective 
counterattacks will not likely result from the normal chain of approvals for military operations; 
instead, counterattacks will need to be largely pre-planned and will need to be automated so they 
are ready to be used against likely adversaries. The degree of such pre-planning, and the degree to 
which it is publicised, can be norms that a state adopts for cyber operations. 
 
Legal or diplomatic responses to any kind of attack are always acceptable and may be better 
responses than a cyber-counterattack, particularly when the original attack is not severe or is 
primarily symbolic. States may adopt norms on this situation. 
 
Purchase of cyberweapons 
It can be cost-effective for a state to obtain cyberweapons from freelance hackers at various online 
exploit markets, where there is price competition and quick delivery, instead of developing its own 
cyberweapons (Stockton & Golabek-Goldman 2013). However, when states purchase 
cyberweapons, they are supporting the development of cyber attacks against everyone. Most of 
these cyber attacks could be used equally for cybercrime, which the purchasing state could be 
inclined to overlook because it needs to preserve a relationship with a supplier. Thus, states have 
a dilemma—develop their own cyberweapons at high cost and deter cybercrime, or buy 
cyberweapons at low cost and encourage cybercrime (Herzog & Schmid 2016). Each state will 
need to set norms for this issue. However, the United Nations has argued that states have a 
responsibility to share vulnerability and remedy information (United Nations General Assembly 
2015), and most cyberweapons are ineffective unless vulnerabilities and remedies are kept secret. 
Such sharing will increase the cost of buying cyberweapons and will make state development of 
cyberweapons more desirable. 
 
Norms about Conducting Warfare in Cyberspace (Jus in Bello) 
The norms most discussed concern the conduct of ongoing cyberwarfare (Table 2, box E) since 
there are many issues that differ from conventional warfare. 
 
Military necessity 
Cyber attacks, like other forms of warfare, must satisfy a test of military necessity in international 
law (Schmitt 2017, rules 111-13). A cyber attack can disable broad infrastructures such as a power 
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grid, but this is rarely necessary; narrower targets will likely equally impede a state’s military 
capabilities. So, a state needs norms regarding the scope of its cyber attacks. Military necessity 
also generally prohibits anticipatory cyber attacks, although surprise is an important part of 
military operations, but not everyone agrees with this prohibition (Lee 2014). 
 
Recent concerns about terrorism have encouraged development of international law on that 
subject. Attacks that have the primary purpose of creating terror (or ‘shock and awe’) are outlawed 
and cannot be justified by any military necessity. This would appear to apply to cyberterrorism 
(Banks 2013); however, the term has no consensus definition, so each state must establish norms 
for defining it. 
 
Confining cyber attacks to military objectives can be difficult because there is no reliable way to 
identify an Internet site as military. A state may camouflage its military sites as civilian to hide 
them, or its civilian sites as military to provoke international outrage if cyber attacked. In addition, 
cyber attacks can be hard to control. Most cyber attacks are based on flaws in software, and those 
flaws can get fixed unexpectedly, thus rendering the attack useless. So most cyberweapons rely on 
multiple methods, which increase the risk of hitting unnecessary targets. ‘Active defences’ that try 
to disable attacking machinery by counterattacks have an increased chance of hitting unnecessary 
targets themselves since cyber attacks are usually launched from well-concealed locations that 
cannot be easily inferred. Automated attacks and counterattacks can be difficult to stop, so they 
can continue causing unnecessary damage for a long time. Indeed, viruses and worms do not check 
the international situation or whether a truce has been signed. Consequently, norms should specify 
the targeting algorithm, acceptable numbers of methods used by a cyber attack, the aggressiveness 
of the cyber attack, and the degree to which a state will consider automated cyber-attack (plus, the 
method and process by which to stop the attack when necessary). 
 
Distinction of combatants from non-combatants 
Particularly important norms about cyberconflict relate to the principle of distinction, that is, 
distinguishing combatants from non-combatants (Schmitt 2017, rules 94-102). Unfortunately, in 
cyberspace, it is easy to hit civilians in a cyber attack (Kelsey 2008). Rowe (2016) enumerates 
nine major ways that such attacks on civilian targets are possible: (1) the ubiquity of cyberspace, 
(2) temptations due to the relative ease of attacking civilian targets, (3) the preponderance of dual- 
use targets, (4) the ease of damaging the environment of the target by cyber methods, (5) the need 
to use civilians as intermediates to reach targets, (6) the unreliability of cyber-attack methods 
which encourages overkill, (7) the possibilities of reusing the cyber-attack methods for cybercrime, 
(8) the frequent use of automated methods that have difficulty distinguishing targets for the 
dissemination of attacks, and (9) the frequent spoofing of identities in cyber attacks causing errant 
counterattacks. 
 
A state can set several kinds of norms with respect to how it will target cyber attacks by considering 
the issues below: 
 
• What kinds of dual-use targets will it attack? Is it willing to attack infrastructure such as 
Internet services and financial systems if they are significantly contributing to a military 
capability? 
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• What proportion of a dual-use target must be military for it to be considered attackable? 
This can vary with the military significance of the military portion. For example, cloud 
servers providing mostly civilian services and backup storage to the military are poor 
targets. 
• What degree of certainty is necessary as to whether something is a legitimate military target 
before launching a cyber attack on it? Mistargeted attacks can appear as reprisals (Schmitt 
2017, rule 109). 
• To what degree will cyber attackers respect neutrality of states (Kelsey 2008)? Will they 
use neutral countries as intermediate steps or staging areas (as with botnets) in the attack? 
Will they use techniques such as encryption to reduce possible damage to neutral states? 
Schmitt (2017, rules 150-52) appears to prohibit using neutral states in cyber attacks, but 
this is almost a necessity for attackers in a networked world. 
• To what degree will a neutral state in a cyberconflict try to find cyber attacks of that conflict 
passing through its cyberspace? To what extent will it cooperate with belligerents to stop 
attacks and counterattacks passing through? 
• Will psychological and physiological damage to non-combatants from a cyber attack be 
considered in targeting, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome and increased anxiety 
(Canetti, Gross & Waismel-Manor 2016)? 
• What limits on side effects such as degradation of cyberspace and even the physical 
environment due to the attack are permissible? Attacks on utilities can cause widespread 
environmental effects. 
• Will a state camouflage its cyber resources? Certain kinds of camouflage, such as making 
a non-military site look like a military site, could invite violations of the laws of war 
(Libicki 2016). 
• To what extent will camouflage of a state’s attacks be used to complicate attribution? There 
are political advantages to acknowledging attacks. 
• To  what  extent  will  attacks  impersonate civilian  entities  (risking perfidy)?  Software 
technology permits new kinds of perfidy, such as changing the targeting of an adversary’s 
weapons systems to target hospitals. New methods of camouflage are increasingly 
sophisticated in making militaries look like civilians (Al-Rodhan 2015). 
• How much overkill will be acceptable when the unreliability of cyberweapons requires 
many methods simultaneously, and too many of them work? 
• Will the attacks use automated methods and how will they will be controlled? The Stuxnet 
attack on Iran propagated autonomously onto many machines having nothing to do with 
Siemens’ process control; effort was required to analyse it and remove it. Autonomous 
propagation is one of many attack options, so it should be a last resort. 
• How can the chances of the attack being reused for criminal attacks on civilians be 
reduced? Stuxnet was precise once it got onto Siemens’ hardware. However, it used 
general-purpose attack methods to disseminate across civilian sites, and those methods 
were reused by criminal organisations later (Kaplan 2011). Attacks can be engineered to 
check for military hardware and software or to check if they are on known military sites, 
but these methods are imperfect. 
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Norms after Cyberconflict 
It is also important to consider norms for jus post bellum or after cyberconflict has ceased (Orend 
2016) (Table 2, box F). Lack of consideration of post-conflict issues was a serious problem in the 
American presence in Iraq in 2003-2010, and recent international conventions on land mines 
assign requirements on removal long after conflict has ceased. Relevant norms specific to 
cyberconflict include the following: 
 
• Attack tracing 
Victim states may need help in tracing cyber attacks on them and determining what has 
been damaged and by whom. The United Nations says that states have an obligation to 
assist other states that are victims of cyber attacks (United Nations General Assembly 
2015). 
• Damage repair assistance 
Assistance may include help with repairs after cyber attacks, particularly for victim states 
that do not have much technological sophistication. 
• Reparability 
Some kinds of cyber-attack damage can be relatively easy to fix (Rowe 2010). An example 
is an attack using encryption, for which decryption can be done to restore the original data. 
A state can specify this kind of attack as a norm, as a more humane form of cyberconflict, 
and also as a way to reduce costs that it may be liable for in restoring services after a 
conflict. 
• Attribution 
Cyber attacks can be acknowledged by the attacking state when it is to their political 
advantage. Attribution can be proved by having the attacking state embed steganographic 
(concealed) information in its attack data or programs that can be revealed when the 
attacker wishes to so that no other state can take credit (Rowe 2015). Attribution to a state 
assigns responsibility for the damage. Attribution to a narrower organisation may be 
important when an attack goes awry since criminal proceedings may then be appropriate. 
However, a convincing attribution may risk revealing intelligence information, as when the 
United States claimed that North Korea was responsible for cyber attacks on Sony 
Corporation in 2014 but said it could not explain how it knew. Norms are thus needed 
regarding how much a state is willing to document its attributions. 
• Removal of cyberaggression tools 
Combatants may agree to be stripped of their cyberweapons and other cyberaggression 
tools as part of an agreement for cessation of hostilities (Orend 2016). 
• Reparations 
Beyond immediate assistance in remediating the effects of an attack, international legal 
authority may authorise reparations for unjustified cyber attacks. Reparations are 
increasingly recognised in international law (Evans 2012; Schmitt 2017, rules 28-29). 
• Prosecution 
Cyber attacks short of war can be criminally prosecuted (Owens, Dam & Lin 2009), either 
using the law of the victim country or the Convention on Cybercrime. 
 
Conclusions 
The formulation of explicit norms by the governments of states is important for the new challenge 
of cyberconflict because of the many ethical choices required and the lack of international laws. 
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Announced and respected norms reduce uncertainty about the consequences of cyberconflict and 
should eventually reduce international tensions. Although the Tallinn Manual 2.0 (Schmitt 2017) 
is a step in the right direction, this article has shown that many additional norms for cyberconflict 
need to be formulated by a government, preferably in written policy, to provide consistency. Many 
norms listed here have a major impact on the conduct of cyberconflict. Furthermore, many of these 
norms do not have good analogies in conventional warfare and will require some thinking to 
articulate. To be sure, significant work lies ahead for nation-states. 
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